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BARELY LEGAL:  VAGUENESS AND THE 
PROHIBITION OF PORNOGRAPHY AS A 
CONDITION OF SUPERVISED RELEASE 
MICHAEL SMITH† 
INTRODUCTION 
Nationwide, over five million men and women were on 
probation or parole at the end of 2006.1  Yet, having been 
released from jail, they are far from free.  They exist in the penal 
equivalent of purgatory, waiting for the day when they can once 
again rejoin society as free citizens.  Until then, although not 
confined to the hell of prison, they are subject to the conditions of 
their release, the violation of which may send them back to jail.  
Sometimes, these conditions prohibit otherwise noncriminal 
activity and even restrict constitutional freedoms.  Judges are 
given wide latitude in determining what discretionary conditions 
to impose on a probationer.  For example, a judge can prohibit a 
probationer from associating with certain people, accessing the 
Internet, or viewing pornography.  These conditions are 
essentially criminal statutes unique to the probationer.  Thus, 
not only must probationers follow the laws that everyone in 
society must follow, they must follow rules that prohibit specific 
noncriminal conduct. 
Even though people on probation, parole, or supervised 
release have their constitutional rights curtailed, they are still 
entitled to some protections, namely due process of the law.  A 
basic principle of due process is the right to be free from vague 
statutes.  In Grayned v. City of Rockford, the Supreme Court 
enumerated three reasons why vague statutes are 
unconstitutional.2  First, a statute must “give the person of 
 
† Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2010, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.A., 2000, New York University. 
1 LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2006, 1 (2007), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1106.  
2 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972). 
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ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited.”3  Such a law allows a person to “act accordingly.”4  As 
the Court noted, “[v]ague laws may trap the innocent by not 
providing fair warning.”5  Second, the law must provide explicit 
standards to those charged with applying the law in order to 
prevent “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement . . . .  A vague 
law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, 
judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective 
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application.”6  Finally, the Court stated that a vague law that 
encroaches upon “sensitive areas of basic First Amendment 
freedoms” naturally “inhibit[s] the exercise of [those] freedoms”7 
because individuals who are uncertain of the meaning of a 
statute will “ ‘steer far wider’ ” than necessary in order to ensure 
compliance.8 
Most probation conditions imposed are specific and do not 
raise vagueness concerns.  Recently, however, circuit courts have 
split over whether imposing a general prohibition on viewing or 
possessing “pornography” is too vague.  The Third and Ninth 
Circuits have held that imposing this condition without defining 
“pornography” violates the probationer’s due process rights.9  
Supporting these circuits, the Second Circuit agreed that the 
term “pornography” is inherently vague, yet has not found a 
factual scenario to overturn the imposition of the condition.10  In 




3 Id. at 108. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 108–09. 
7 Id. at 109 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) and quoting 
Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Ins., 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961)). 
8 Id. (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)). 
9 United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 254 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he prohibition on 
pornography is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide any method for 
Loy or his probation officer to distinguish between those items that are merely 
titillating and those items that are ‘pornographic.’ ”); United States v. Guagliardo, 
278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the term “pornography” is “entirely 
subjective” and “lacks any recognized legal definition”). 
10 See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting 
that although it is difficult to define pornography, under federal law the “definition 
of pornography . . . is sufficiently specific to give adequate notice as to what conduct 
violates a prohibition on pornographic material”). 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 727 (2010) 
2010] BARELY LEGAL 729 
the viewing or possession of “pornography” does not violate due 
process rights because there is a commonsense definition of 
“pornography” that gives probationers sufficient notice.11 
This Note argues that a judge violates a probationer’s right 
to sufficiently specific conditions of supervised release that 
provide fair warning and curtail arbitrary and discriminatory 
application when he or she imposes a ban on viewing or 
possessing pornography because the term lacks a specific legal 
definition.12  For a condition banning “pornography” to be validly 
imposed, a sufficiently specific definition of pornography must be 
developed that satisfies due process while also achieving the 
goals of probation and preserving judicial flexibility in imposing 
sentences.   
Part I of this Note will discuss the current sentencing 
scheme in the federal system.  It will discuss the goals of 
sentencing under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (the 
“Sentencing Guidelines” or “Guidelines”) and the discretion given 
to judges in imposing appropriate sentences, as well as some 
procedural safeguards.  Additionally, Part I will discuss the 
process of supervised release, including how judges impose 
conditions and the process for revoking supervised release if a 
probationer violates a condition.13  Part II of this Note will 
discuss the circuit split over the imposition of a general ban on 
legal adult pornography.  Finally, Part III of this Note will 
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of requiring district 
courts to give a sufficiently specific definition of pornography 
when setting conditions of supervised release.  Also, Part III will 
provide a specific definition of pornography that satisfies the 
Supreme Court’s vagueness concerns in Grayned and will show 
how this definition properly balances the rights of the 
probationer—namely, the right to conditions that are not 
 
11 United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 193 (5th Cir. 2003). 
12 The courts also use the terms “sexually stimulating” or “sexually oriented” 
material. Arguably, those terms are even vaguer than “pornography.” For example, 
advertisements for women’s underwear are not pornographic but could be considered 
sexually stimulating. Thus, while this Note will focus on the word “pornography,” 
the analysis applies equally to the terms “sexually stimulating” or “sexually 
oriented” material, and the proposed definition could also apply to these terms. 
13 While this Note focuses on the federal system, because the condition imposed 
implicates constitutional concerns and given the similarities between conditions of 
supervised release, parole and probation, the analysis could apply equally to state 
courts imposing a similar condition. 
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vague—with the goals of supervised release—ensuring public 
safety and furthering the probationer’s rehabilitation. 
I. SENTENCING AND SUPERVISED RELEASE IN THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 
A. The Sentencing Guidelines 
The Sentencing Guidelines are a vast scheme of regulations 
promulgated in 198714 by the Sentencing Commission15 and 
designed to accomplish several goals,16 namely uniformity, 
proportionality, and “honesty” in sentencing.17  The Guidelines 
prescribe sentencing ranges for various federal crimes based on a 
variety of factors that judges use to determine what specific 
sentence to impose.18  The Guidelines also allow judges to impose 
sentences greater or lesser than the range if the judge finds 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.19  Until the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Booker20 in 2005 declaring the 
mandatory nature of the Guidelines unconstitutional,21 the 
Guidelines were mandatory and district court judges were 
required to impose the sentence given after making the requisite 
calculation.22  Currently, the Guidelines are advisory, although 
district court judges are still required to consult them.23 
 
14 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2009) (guidelines 
submitted to Congress on April 13, 1987 and took effect on November 1, 1987). 
15 The Commission itself was created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See 
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–
673 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (2006)). 
16 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (listing several factors to consider when a judge 
imposes sentences which embody the principles of deterrence, incapacitation, just 
punishment, and rehabilitation); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1A1.2. 
17 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2009). 
18 Id. § 1A1.2 (“The Commission is required to prescribe guideline ranges that 
specify an appropriate sentence for each class of convicted persons determined by 
coordinating the offense behavior categories with the offender characteristic 
categories.”).  
19 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (stating that a court can depart from the guideline 
ranges if it “finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a 
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission”). 
20 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
21 Id. at 244–45. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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The Guidelines allow judges to impose a term of supervised 
release during sentencing.24  Supervised release is a period of 
time after the convict has been released from prison during 
which the convict must follow certain conditions imposed on him 
or her by the court.25  Once the term of supervised release 
expires, the convict has completed his or her sentence and is once 
again a free person. 
The Guidelines advise judges to impose certain mandatory 
conditions of supervised release, such as a prohibition on 
possessing a controlled substance and a prohibition on violating 
any federal, state, or local laws.26  The Guidelines also suggest 
other, discretionary conditions that should be imposed depending 
on the nature of the crime.27  Courts have wide discretion in 
setting conditions of supervised release,28 including the authority 
 
24 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1 (2009). The Guidelines 
require a term of supervised release when a judge imposes a sentence of more than 
one year or when required by statute. Id. § 5D1.1(a). The judge is also allowed to 
impose supervised release “in any other case.” Id. § 5D1.1(b). Subsection (b) applies 
if the judge finds that supervised release is necessary “for any of the following 
reasons: (1) to protect the public welfare; (2) to enforce a financial condition; (3) to 
provide drug or alcohol treatment or testing; (4) to assist the reintegration of the 
defendant into the community; or (5) to accomplish any other sentencing purpose 
authorized by statute.” Id. § 5D1.1 cmts. 1–2. 
25 See Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., The Alpha and Omega of Supervised Release, 60 
ALB. L. REV. 267, 269 (1996). Judge Baer, District Court Judge for the Southern 
District of New York, goes into great detail and provides a helpful analysis of 
supervised release, its imposition and revocation. He notes that supervised release is 
different from parole and probation. Id. Parole is a release from prison before a 
convict has completed his sentence of imprisonment, supervised release is imposed 
in addition to imprisonment, and probation is a sentence where imprisonment is 
suspended. Id. at 269–70. However, the Second Circuit has noted that “supervised 
release is essentially similar to parole.” United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1121 
(2d Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court also noted that probation and parole are 
“constitutionally indistinguishable.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.3 
(1973); see also United States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523, 527 n.2 (4th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 1993). 
26 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5B1.3(a) (2009). 
27 Id. § 5B1.3(c)–(e). 
28 See United States v. Jorge-Salgado, 520 F.3d 840, 842 (8th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. 
Henkel, 358 F.3d 1013, 1014 (8th Cir. 2004)); United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 
72, 80 (2d Cir. 2003). For an example of this discretion, consider United States v. 
Brogdon, where a trial court imposed, and the Sixth Circuit upheld, a condition 
prohibiting the defendant from possessing pornographic material even though he 
pleaded guilty to “being a felon in possession of a firearm.” 503 F.3d 555, 557 (6th 
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1211 (2008). The court found the imposition was 
reasonable based on the defendant’s criminal history of indecent exposure, even 
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to curtail constitutional freedoms.29  The Supreme Court has 
noted that a probationer, while having more freedom than 
someone who is incarcerated, is still serving a sentence and can 
have freedoms curtailed.30  The Guidelines allow judges to impose 
any condition as long as that condition is “reasonably related to 
the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2) and to the 
extent that such condition[ ] involve[s] only such deprivations of 
liberty or property as are reasonably necessary for the purposes 
indicated in section 3553(a)(2).”31  Under section 3553(a)(1), when 
imposing a condition of supervised release, a judge must consider 
“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant.”32  Moreover, under section 
3553(a)(2), the judge must consider 
the need for the sentence imposed . . . (A) to reflect the 
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 
provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate 
deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from 
further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the 
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner.33 
 
though the most recent incident occurred eleven years prior to his conviction for 
possession of a firearm. Id. at 558, 565. 
29 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 n.2 (2006) (“[P]arolee’s 
constitutional rights are indeed limited . . . .”) (dicta); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471, 483 (1972) (finding that states have the ability to impose restrictions on a 
parolee’s liberty); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 497 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that 
nonobscene pornographic material is protected by the First Amendment when 
possessed by “ordinary adults, but may be regulated in the hands of parolees to a 
much greater extent”); Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1243 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding 
that the government can infringe on the rights of parolees as long as it is reasonably 
and necessarily related to the government’s legitimate interests). Besides First 
Amendment restrictions, the state can restrict Fourth Amendment freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 852–53; see also Isaac 
B. Rosenberg, Involuntary Endogenous RFID Compliance Monitoring as a Condition 
of Federal Supervised Release—Chips Ahoy?, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 331, 348–49 
(2008) (collecting cases allowing for deprivations of liberty as a condition of 
supervised release). 
30 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 48 (2007). 
31 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (2006); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5B1.3(b) (2009). 
32 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006). 
33 Id. § 3553(a)(2). 
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After considering the above factors, the judge must state with 
specificity the reasons for imposing the conditions to facilitate 
appellate review.34 
B. Revocation of Supervised Release35 
A term of supervised release does not begin until the 
probationer is released from prison.36  Once released, a probation 
officer provides a written statement to the probationer detailing 
with sufficient specificity the conditions imposed.37  The 
probation officer must supervise the probationer to ensure that 
he or she is following the conditions,38 and the officer is also 
responsible to report any violations to the sentencing court.39 
Probationers accused of violating supervised release are 
entitled to some procedural due process, but not to the same 
extent as a person accused of a crime,40 even though for practical 
purposes the result—punishment if found guilty—is the same.  
The professed reason for the lesser degree of due process is that 
the revocation of supervised release is “not a criminal 
proceeding.”41  Therefore, a probationer is not entitled to a jury 
and does not have a Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.42  Also, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
generally does not apply; hearsay can be admissible evidence,  
and the government need only prove a violation by a 
preponderance of the evidence instead of beyond a reasonable 
doubt.43 
 
34 Id. § 3553(c). On appeal, an appellate court reviews the imposition for abuse 
of discretion. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
35 For a detailed discussion of supervised release and revocation proceedings, see 
generally Baer, supra note 25.  
36 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (2006). 
37 18 U.S.C. § 3583(f) (2006). 
38 18 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3603(2), (4) (2006). 
39 Id. § 3603(2), (8)(B). 
40 United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[M]ost of the 
fundamental constitutional procedural protections that are normally applicable to a 
criminal prosecution are not required for supervised-release proceedings as a matter 
of constitutional law.”) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973)); see also 
United States v. Pratt, 52 F.3d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[A] defendant is afforded 
only the minimum requirements of due process at a revocation hearing.”) (citing 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972)). 
41 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984). 
42 See Baer, supra note 25, at 287–90. 
43 Id. at 288–89. 
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In general, a probationer accused of violating a condition of 
supervised release is entitled to two hearings, a preliminary 
hearing and a revocation hearing.44  The court may issue a 
warrant, or a probation officer, without a warrant but with 
probable cause, may arrest a probationer suspected of violating a 
condition of supervised release.45  If the probationer is in custody 
for the violation, then the court must have a prompt preliminary 
hearing “to determine whether there is probable cause to believe 
that a violation occurred.”46  A court is required to give the 
probationer: 
(i) notice of the hearing and its purpose, the alleged violation, 
and the person’s right to retain counsel or to request that 
counsel be appointed if the person cannot obtain counsel; (ii) an 
opportunity to appear at the hearing and present evidence; and 
(iii) upon request, an opportunity to question any adverse 
witness, unless the judge determines that the interest of justice 
does not require the witness to appear.47 
If the judge determines that there is probable cause that a 
violation occurred, then he or she must hold a revocation 
hearing48 “within a reasonable time.”49  In advance of the 
hearing, a probationer is entitled to: 
(A) written notice of the alleged violation; (B) disclosure of the 
evidence against the person; (C) an opportunity to appear, 
present evidence, and question any adverse witness unless the 
court determines that the interest of justice does not require the 
witness to appear; (D) notice of the person’s right to retain 
counsel or to request that counsel be appointed if the person 
cannot obtain counsel; and (E) an opportunity to make a 
statement and present any information in mitigation.50 
Once a court determines that a probationer violated a 
condition of supervised release, it may revoke the probationer’s 
supervised release and have that person incarcerated.51  The 
court can order imprisonment up to the full time allowed under 
 
44 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(1)–(2). 
45 18 U.S.C. § 3606 (2006). 
46 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(1)(A). The probationer may waive the hearing. Id. 
47 Id. 32.1(b)(1)(B). 
48 Id. 32.1(b)(1)(C). A revocation hearing, however, may also be waived by the 
probationer. Id. 32.1(b)(2). 
49 Id. 32.1(b)(2). 
50 Id. 32.1(b)(2)(A)–(E). 
51 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006). 
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the statute under which the probationer was originally 
convicted.52  A court is not required to give credit for any time of 
supervised release already served.53  Additionally, a probationer 
can be punished for violating a condition of supervised release 
and punished for the underlying conduct, if the conduct violates a 
law, without implicating double jeopardy concerns.54 
Given the wide discretion courts may exercise in crafting 
conditions of supervised release and the dire consequences of 
violating a condition, it is imperative that the conditions imposed 
on the probationer be sufficiently specific to allow him or her to 
avoid that conduct which would violate the condition. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROHIBITING POSSESSION OF 
PORNOGRAPHY 
Circuits are split over the constitutionality of  
imposing a general ban on possession of “pornography” as a 
condition of supervised release,55 specifically, whether the term 
 
52 Id. However, the term of imprisonment is subject to maximums under 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The maximums are up to five years if convicted of a Class A 
felony, up to three years if convicted of a class B felony, up to two years if convicted 
of a Class C or D felony, or up to one year in any other cases. Id. For example, 
someone convicted of a Class C felony could have had a maximum term of 
imprisonment of twenty-four years and 364 days and an original term of supervised 
release of three years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3) (2006); see also 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2). Upon revocation, a court could only impose a maximum term 
of imprisonment of two years. However, if the probationer had served the maximum 
sentence of imprisonment, his imprisonment would now exceed that by two years. 
See Baer, supra note 25, at 292–93. 
53 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). 
54 See United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1122–23 (2d Cir. 1994). 
55 State courts have also reviewed similar conditions imposed on state parolees 
or probationers. States are similarly split as to whether the imposition of such a 
condition is unconstitutionally vague. Compare McVey v. State, 863 N.E.2d 434, 447 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding condition prohibiting possession of pornographic or 
sexually explicit materials was unconstitutionally vague), Fitzgerald v. State, 805 
N.E.2d 857, 866–67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (same), State v. Bahl, 193 P.3d 678, 688 
(Wash. 2008) (same), and State v. Sansone, 111 P.3d 1251, 1255 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2005) (same), with Wilfong v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 84, 99 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) 
(holding that a commonsense reading of the phrase “sexually arousing materials” 
does not render the ambiguous phrase unconstitutionally vague regarding its use in 
a condition of probation), and Belt v. State, 127 S.W.3d 277, 281–82 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2004) (holding that condition prohibiting possession of “ ‘sexually stimulating’ or 
‘sexually oriented’ ” material was not unconstitutionally vague). See also 
Commonwealth v. Perreault, 930 A.2d 553, 560 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (holding that a 
condition is not unconstitutionally vague when statutes provide definitions of the 
terms). But cf. Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 814–15 (Fla. 2008) (applying the 
rule that ambiguous statutes are to be construed in favor of the criminal defendant 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 727 (2010) 
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“pornography” as it applies to conditions of supervised release is 
inherently vague.  The Third and Ninth Circuits held that it is.  
The Second Circuit stated that the term is inherently vague but 
has not expressly overturned the imposition of a condition 
banning pornography.  The Fifth Circuit, however, held that the 
term is not inherently vague.56 
A. Void for Vagueness Doctrine 
Embodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine57 invalidates any statute58 that is “so 
 
in interpreting an ambiguous statute providing for a condition prohibiting 
possession of pornographic materials). Because vagueness is a constitutional issue, 
the analysis and the definition are applicable to state law. 
56 While the Third, Ninth, Second, and Fifth Circuits have all taken a position 
on this issue, other circuits have only ruled that there was no plain error on the part 
of the district court, but did not decide whether, when properly reviewed, they would 
find the condition unconstitutional. See United States v. Wilkinson, 282 F. App’x 
750, 753–54 (11th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 
(8th Cir. 2003). 
57 The Supreme Court case of Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 
(1972), exemplifies the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. In 
Papachristou, the Court held that Jacksonville’s vagrancy law was void for 
vagueness, violating both prongs of the vagueness test. Id. at 162. First, the Court 
found that the law failed to give fair notice because “[t]he Jacksonville ordinance 
makes criminal activities which by modern standards are normally innocent.” Id. at 
163. The Court also found that the statute prohibited “activities [that] are 
historically part of the amenities of life” and activities that “have encouraged lives of 
high spirits rather than hushed, suffocating silence.” Id. at 164. Second, the Court 
found that the ordinance gave “unfettered discretion” to the Jacksonville Police. Id. 
at 168. It stated that there were no standards “governing the exercise of the 
discretion” to the police, and that this type of law encourages “arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement of the law. It furnishes a convenient tool for ‘harsh and 
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups 
deemed to merit their displeasure.’ ” Id. at 170 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 
U.S. 88, 97–98 (1940)). The ordinance, according to the Court, required people to 
“comport themselves according to the life style deemed appropriate by the 
Jacksonville police and the courts.” Id. 
58 It should be noted that it is questionable whether the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine applies to conditions of supervised release. The Supreme Court has never 
ruled that it does, although lower courts have applied the doctrine to conditions of 
supervised release. See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 484–85 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(applying vagueness doctrine to condition of probation); United States v. Guagliardo, 
278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 262 (3d Cir. 
2001); United States v. Schave, 186 F.3d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 1999). Also, in Morrissey 
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Court noted that conditions are sometimes “quite 
vague” but did not apply the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Id. at 479. Regardless, no 
circuit court has ruled that void-for-vagueness should not be applied to conditions of 
supervised release. However, none of the courts explain why the doctrine should 
apply to conditions of supervised release. Arguably, the courts may feel that it is so 
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vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning and differ as to its application.”59  The Supreme 
Court has fashioned a two-prong test to determine whether a 
statute is void for vagueness.60  Either prong can be satisfied to 
strike down a law as void-for-vagueness.  First, a statute will be 
void if it “fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable 
ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits.”61  The 
purpose of this prong is to ensure a statute gives fair notice to 
enable a person to “conform his or her conduct to the law.”62  
Second, a statute will be void if it “may authorize and even 
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”63  For 
example, a vague statute may allow “ ‘a standardless sweep 
[that] allows policemen [and] prosecutors . . . to pursue their 
personal predilections.’ ”64 
While the Supreme Court has noted that a statute is not 
vague when a person “exercising ordinary common sense can 
sufficiently understand” the statute,65 a statute will be 
considered unconstitutionally vague if enforcement depends on a 
completely subjective standard.66  Thus, if it is up to the police 
officer on the street to decide what conduct falls within the 
statute because the statute itself does not define the prohibited 
conduct, then enforcement depends on a completely subjective 
standard. 
 
obvious that the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to conditions of supervised 
release that they feel no need to justify the application. Practically speaking, the 
application of this doctrine to conditions of supervised makes sense. Although 
conditions are unique to the person on whom it is imposed, they are state-enforced 
prohibitions on conduct, the violation of which may lead to punishment, like any 
criminal statute. See United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840, 843–44 (9th Cir. 1977). 
59 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see also Giaccio v. 
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402–03 (1966) (holding that a law violates due process if 
it is not sufficiently definite). 
60 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (plurality opinion). 
61 Id.; see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
62 Morales, 527 U.S. at 58. 
63 Id. at 56; see also Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.  
64 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)) 
(noting that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is “the more important aspect 
of [the] vagueness doctrine”). 
65 U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 579 
(1973). 
66 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 113 (1972); see also Coates v. 
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (holding that a statute is impermissibly vague 
when it prohibits conduct that annoys some but would not annoy others). 
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B. Circuit Court Split:  Is “Pornography” a Vague Term? 
While not all laws will be struck down merely because they 
are vague,67 the Supreme Court requires laws that affect 
constitutionally protected rights, especially First Amendment 
rights, to meet the stringent standards of the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine, and it has not hesitated to strike down a law designed 
to protect the public and enacted with a valid purpose if it is too 
vague.68  Some circuit courts have been equally adamant that, 
though there may be valid purposes, conditions of supervised 
release prohibiting the possession of pornography must be 
overturned because the term itself is inherently vague. 
1. Third Circuit:  Pornography Is Inherently Vague 
In United States v. Loy,69 the Third Circuit held that a 
condition prohibiting possession of “ ‘all forms of pornography, 
including legal adult pornography’ ”70 is unconstitutionally vague 
“because it fails to provide any method for [defendant] or his 
probation officer to distinguish between those items that are 
merely titillating and those items that are ‘pornographic.’ ”71  
Also, the court held that the prohibition did not “provide any 
guidance as to whether the restriction extends only to visual 
materials, or whether purely textual works and sound recordings 
fall within its scope.”72  The Third Circuit did not forbid a district  
court from prohibiting a probationer from viewing or possessing 
pornography, but required that the condition must be “more 
tightly defined.”73 
In Loy, Ray Donald Loy was convicted of receiving and 
possessing child pornography.74  Loy had answered an 
advertisement in a “sexually explicit” magazine that invited 
readers, in a round about way, to trade pornography involving 
 
67 See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 498 (1982) (“The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates—as well as 
the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement—depends in part on the 
nature of the enactment.”). 
68 See Morales, 527 U.S. at 62, 64. 
69 United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001). 
70 Id. at 253. 
71 Id. at 254. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 267. 
74 Id. at 253. 
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children.75  In exchange for a video of young girls bathing, Loy 
agreed to send a video of children engaging in sex.76  However, 
the advertisement was part of a joint undercover child 
pornography investigation conducted by the United States Postal 
Inspection Service and the Pennsylvania State Attorney 
General’s Office.77  Law enforcement officers arrested Loy at his 
home after they observed him pick up the videotape of children 
bathing at his post office box.78  In his home, inspectors found 
another tape depicting child pornography, as well as fifteen 
computer disks, also containing child pornography.79  After 
pleading guilty to one count of receiving child pornography in the 
mail, Loy was sentenced to thirty-three months of incarceration 
and three years of supervised release.80  The District Court 
imposed a condition prohibiting Loy from possessing “ ‘all forms 
of pornography, including legal adult pornography.’ ”81  Loy 
appealed the imposition of that condition.82 
In overturning the imposition of the condition prohibiting 
possession of pornography, the Third Circuit reasoned that, 
unlike obscenity, “the term ‘pornography’ . . . has never received 
a precise legal definition from the Supreme Court or any other 
federal court of appeals, and remains undefined in the federal 
code.”83  The court noted that it could provide “numerous 
examples of books and films” that it could not say definitely were 
or were not pornographic.84  The court also noted that the 
government was not able to determine whether Playboy would be 
prohibited.85  Finally, because neither the court nor the 
 
75 Id. at 254. 
76 Id. at 254–55. 
77 Id. at 254. 
78 Id. at 255. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 253. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 263. The court noted, however, that federal law contains a definition of 
child pornography. Id. at 263 n.4. 
84 Id. at 264. The court listed as examples Playboy, which contained nudity but 
not sexual conduct, the film adaptations of Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita, some Calvin 
Klein advertisements, and Edouard Manet’s Le Dejeuner sur L’Herbe, which depicts 
a nude woman lunching with two fully dressed men. Id. The court further noted that 
it could not determine whether the condition prohibiting pornography applied only 
to visual materials or if it included pure text and sound recordings. Id. 
85 Id. The court stated that “[e]ven the government conceded . . . that it does not 
know whether Playboy is part of this group, which is, in fact, a change from its 
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government could discern what material was prohibited, the 
court found it unfair to assume that the probationer could do so 
in advance.86 
In addition to finding that the probationer could not 
reasonably determine what material was prohibited and what 
was not, the Third Circuit held that the condition gave “the 
probation officer an unfettered power of interpretation.”87  It 
noted that this power would “create one of the very problems 
against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect, i.e., the 
delegation of ‘basic policy matters to policemen . . . for resolution 
on an ad hoc and subjective basis.’ ”88  As a solution, the Third 
Circuit recommended that a judge imposing conditions of 
supervised release borrow applicable language from the federal 
statutory definition of child pornography at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8).89 
2. Ninth Circuit:  Pornography Is Inherently Vague 
Agreeing with the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, in United 
States v. Guagliardo,90 held that a “blanket prohibition” on 
pornography violated a probationer’s due process rights because 
of the inherent vagueness of the term.91  In Guagliardo, Thomas 
Guagliardo engaged in an online chat with an undercover police 
detective claiming to have a large collection of child pornography, 
 
position, taken during oral argument, that Playboy absolutely constituted 
‘pornography.’ ” Id.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 266. 
88 Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972)). 
89 Id. at 267. The relevant portion of the statute reads, “any visual depiction, 
including any photography, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated 
image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other 
means, of sexually explicit conduct.” Id. at 267 n.8. 
90 United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002). 
91 Id. at 872. The Ninth Circuit later approved a condition that prohibited 
possession of pornography that was tied to the definition of sexually explicit 
material in the federal child pornography statute. See United States v. Rearden, 349 
F.3d 608, 620 (9th Cir. 2003). This is in line with the Third Circuit’s suggestion in 
Loy that district courts use that specific language to overcome a vagueness 
challenge. See Loy, 237 F.3d at 267. The Second Circuit also held that if a person is 
convicted under the child pornography statute, then there is no vagueness issue with 
regard to a condition prohibiting possession of pornography since it is defined within 
the statute. See United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir. 2003). But see United States v. Voelker, 
489 F.3d 139, 152 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that, even though the district court 
imposed a condition prohibiting sexually explicit material as defined in a federal 
statute, the condition was not “narrowly tailored”). 
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and agreed to meet with the undercover detective to give him 
copies of some of his collection.92  When Guagliardo gave the 
detective three computer disks containing child pornography, the 
detective arrested him.93  After a bench trial, Guagliardo was 
convicted of possession of child pornography and sentenced to 
fifteen months imprisonment followed by three years of 
supervised release.94  The trial court imposed a condition of 
supervised release that prohibited Guagliardo from possessing 
any pornography, including legal adult pornography.95  
Guagliardo appealed the conviction and the condition.96 
In overturning the imposition of the condition, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that “a probationer cannot reasonably understand 
what is encompassed” by the pornography prohibition because 
the “term itself is entirely subjective” and “it lacks any 
recognized legal definition.”97  The court pointed out that the 
district court itself could not define the term and scoffed at the 
district court’s declaration that it would not “ ‘have any trouble 
defining it if [Guagliardo] violate[d] it.’ ”98 
3. Second Circuit:  While Pornography May Be Vague, the 
Court Has Not Overturned the Imposition 
The Second Circuit’s approach to conditions of supervised 
release prohibiting the possession of pornography is less 
straightforward than the Third and Ninth Circuits—which 
require sentencing judges to define the term “pornography.”  
First, in United States v. Simmons,99 the Second Circuit held that 
the term “pornography” is inherently vague.100  However, the 
court affirmed the condition imposed by the trial court, which 
prohibited possession of “any pornographic material, including 
videotapes, films, magazines, books and photographs, nor shall 
he subscribe to ‘adult-only’ movie channels.”101  The court 
 
92 Guagliardo, 278 F.3d at 870. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 872. 
96 Id. at 870. 
97 Id. at 872. 
98 Id. (“This after-the-fact definition . . . leaves Guagliardo in [an] untenable 
position . . . .”). 
99 United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2003). 
100 Id. at 82. 
101 Id. at 77. 
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reasoned that since Simmons was convicted under a statute that 
contained a definition of pornography, he was on notice as to 
what material the condition prohibited.102 
In Simmons, Alan Simmons pleaded guilty to “knowingly 
transporting a minor in foreign commerce for the purpose of 
engaging in illegal sexual conduct” and “to using a minor to 
engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a 
videotape of the conduct.”103  Simmons, a Canadian, took a ski 
trip to Vermont with his two sons, aged nine and twelve, and a 
fifteen-year-old girl, B.B., whom Simmons had coached in a girls’ 
hockey league and whose mother Simmons had dated.104  After a 
day of skiing, they all ate dinner and watched videos.105  
Simmons prepared drinks for the kids, and later they fell asleep 
but did not wake up until noon the next day.106  The girl thought 
this was unusual because she was an early riser; however, she 
did not suspect any wrongdoing.107 
Four years later, Canadian authorities, while executing a 
search warrant in connection with an alcohol and tobacco 
smuggling case, seized a videotape of Simmons sexually abusing 
an unconscious adolescent female.108  After investigating, the 
authorities determined that the tape had been made in Vermont 
during the ski trip and that the girl in the tape was B.B.109  A 
federal grand jury in Vermont indicted Simmons, and he 
subsequently pleaded guilty to both charges contained in the 
indictment.110  He was sentenced to 168 months imprisonment, to 
be followed by three years of supervised release.111  He appealed, 
among other things, the condition of supervised release that 
prohibited him from possessing any pornographic material.112 
In affirming the condition, the Second Circuit held that when 
a defendant is convicted under a statutory scheme that includes 
a definition of pornography, he is given “adequate notice as to 
 
102 Id. at 81–82; see also United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir. 
2003). 
103 Simmons, 343 F.3d at 74. 







111 Id. at 77. 
112 Id. at 74–75. 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 727 (2010) 
2010] BARELY LEGAL 743 
what conduct violates a prohibition on pornographic material.”113  
Simmons was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) for persuading 
a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of 
producing a videotape.114  The court noted that the statute fell 
under the same chapter of the United States Code that contained 
a definition of child pornography.115  According to the court, the 
section’s “definition of pornography avoids reference to subjective 
standards and is sufficiently specific to give adequate notice as to 
what conduct violates a prohibition on pornographic material.”116  
The court did not require the district court to explicitly reference 
the definition, but “urge[d] them to do so in future cases, 
particularly since in other contexts the term [was] inherently 
vague.”117 
In Farrell v. Burke,118 the Second Circuit again held that the 
term “pornography” is inherently vague,119 but refused to strike 
down the condition as being void for vagueness because it found, 
as applied to Farrell, that the material he possessed “fit[ ] within 
any reasonable understanding of the term” pornography.120 
In Farrell, Christopher J. Farrell filed a federal civil rights 
claim alleging that his parole officers violated his Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights by enforcing a condition of his 
parole that prohibited possession of pornographic material.121  
Farrell had been arrested after paying four boys between the 
ages of thirteen and sixteen to have anal and oral sex with him at 
his home.122  He pleaded guilty in state court to three counts of 
sodomy in the third degree.123  After serving almost four years, he 
 
113 Id. at 82. 
114 Id. at 81 n.6. 
115 Id. at 81. 
116 Id. at 82. 
117 Id. 
118 Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2006). 
119 Id. at 490. In fact, the court went to great lengths to reiterate the fact that 
the term is inherently vague. Id. at 486. It quoted from both the Third and Ninth 
Circuits, id. at 487–88, state appellate courts, id. at 488 n.4, and New York case law, 
id. at 488. It rejected the state’s argument that it should “reject the holdings of these 
cases” because the term pornography can be determined by “value-free criteria.” Id. 
The court finally noted that its ruling did not “in any way challenge the earlier cases 
from this Circuit and others finding that the term is insufficient to give notice to a 
reasonable offender of what material sweeps within its prohibition.” Id. at 490. 
120 Id. at 490. 
121 Id. at 476. 
122 Id. It is unclear how he was arrested. 
123 Id. 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 727 (2010) 
744 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:727   
was paroled.124  The parole officer imposed the standard 
conditions that New York law requires, as well as a special 
condition that Farrell would “not own or possess any 
pornographic material.”125  Four months before Farrell’s parole 
was to expire, his parole officers visited him.126  At Farrell’s 
apartment, the officers found three publications—a book called 
Scum: True Homosexual Experiences, a magazine called My 
Comrade with the headline “Gay Sex! The Shocking Truth!,” and 
an anthology called Best Gay Erotica 1996—all dealing with 
homosexual subject matters.127  After looking through the 
material, the parole officer arrested Farrell.128 
At Farrell’s revocation hearing, the parole officer testified 
that the book, Scum, and magazine, My Comrade, were 
pornographic because they contained pictures of nude men in 
certain positions.129  The officer also testified, in general, that 
possession of Playboy would have been prohibited.130  Regarding 
purely textual material, the officer testified that he would not 
arrest someone but would “run it past [his] supervisor and let  
him make that decision.”131  Finally, according to the parole 
officer, if a parolee possessed a photograph of the statue of David, 
then the officer would have “locked [the parolee] up for that.”132 
Farrell testified that he believed the prohibition related to 
“[t]he kind of stuff that you would get in an adult book store or 
an x-rated movie or a book that has pictures of people engaging 
in sex activity where the whole purpose of the book is to arouse 
your sexual appetite.”133  He further explained that he believed 
pornographic material contained “pictures of people engaging in 
sexual activity . . . whose sole purpose is to pander [to] people’s 
 
124 Id. 
125 Id. Under New York law, a parole officer can impose special conditions. See 
N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 9, § 8003.2(l) (2010). 
126 Farrell, 449 F.3d at 477. 
127 Id. The officer looked through the publications and saw sexually explicit 
pictures. Id. He did not read the text. Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 479. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 479–80. 
132 Id. at 479. The parole officer did not know what the statue of David was, so 
counsel for Farrell described it as “a large sculpture of a nude youth with his 
genitals exposed and visible,” prompting the officer’s response. Id. 
133 Id. at 480. 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 727 (2010) 
2010] BARELY LEGAL 745 
sexual arousal.”134  Farrell did not believe that either the book or 
the magazine were pornographic.135 
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) presiding over the 
revocation hearing found that the magazine was not 
pornographic but that the book was.136  The ALJ noted that the 
magazine was satirical in nature.137  However, the book, Scum, 
contained “numerous pictures [of] frontal male nudity, erect 
penises and males fondling their genitals.”138  Scum also 
contained “numerous stories which describe sexual encounters 
involving underage males.”139  The plaintiff’s parole was revoked 
and he was ordered held until the expiration of his maximum 
sentence.140 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reaffirmed that the term 
“pornography” was “vague if it was not tied to a specific 
definition.”141  It noted that “[w]here the offense of conviction 
does not involve pornography, a statutory definition of that term 
in a criminal statute that the defendant has never encountered 
no more provides notice of the meaning of that term than does 
any other definition of pornography.”142  The court also noted that 
the condition did not provide any standards for those who 
enforced the term.143 
The Second Circuit held, however, that, even though the 
term is inherently vague, the nature of the book, Scum, was such 
that any reasonable definition of pornography would have 
included it and that Farrell was on notice that the book was 
prohibited.144  The condition “provided adequate standards for the 
parole officers to determine whether Scum was prohibited, even 
though its application to other materials would have been 
 
134 Id. 
135 Id. The plaintiff felt that the magazine was satirical in nature and not meant 
to arouse sexual feeling. Id. Regarding the book, the plaintiff felt like it was a 
“history of the way homosexuals lead their lives” and it provided “analysis of the way 
sexual behavior is reported in mainstream newspapers.” Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 481. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. The plaintiff served four-and-a-half months incarceration for the 
violation. Id. 
141 Id. at 486. 
142 Id. at 487. 
143 Id. at 493. 
144 Id. at 492. 
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uncertain.”145  In so holding, the Second Circuit noted various 
possible definitions of pornography, including Farrell’s own 
testimony about what he believed to be pornography, and applied 
those definitions to Scum.146  The court, however, admonished the 
State for failing to “provide meaningful notice of the scope of the 
Special Condition’s prohibition or meaningful limits on an 
enforcing officer’s discretion.”147  It concluded, “We hope that 
greater efforts will be made in the future to define adequately the 
terms of parole conditions dealing with pornographic 
materials.”148  Thus, the Second Circuit seemed to adopt the 
reasoning of the Third and Ninth Circuits, but refused to apply 
the standards to the facts in this particular case. 
4. Fifth Circuit:  “Pornography” Is Not Inherently Vague 
In contrast to the Third and Ninth Circuits, the Fifth 
Circuit, in United States v. Phipps,149 held that, while the phrase 
“sexually stimulating” material is vague, the condition must be 
read in a “ ‘commonsense way’ because ‘it would be impossible to 
list’ every instance of prohibited conduct”150 and this 
“commonsense reading of the special condition satisfies the 
dictates of due process.”151  In Phipps, Michael Phipps and Dean 
Gilley followed a woman as she drove home from work.152  After 
she drove into her carport, Phipps put a gun to her head and 
then Gilley restrained her in the back seat.153  While Phipps 
drove on the highway, Gilley raped the woman while 
continuously threatening her.154  Although Phipps and Gilley 
switched positions, Phipps did not rape the woman because 
Gilley warned Phipps to wait until they got to a motel.155  At a 
 
145 Id. at 494. 
146 Id. at 490–92. 
147 Id. at 498. 
148 Id. 
149 United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2003). 
150 Id. at 193 (quoting United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 167 (5th Cir. 2001)). 
151 Id. The court later stated that, because the issue was reviewed for plain error 
since the defendant failed to object to the condition when it was imposed, it would 
reserve the question whether the court would uphold a similar condition when 
reviewed de novo. Id. at 194 n.20. However, the court later reaffirmed the holding in 
Phipps in an unpublished decision. See United States v. Hartshorn, 163 F. App’x 
325, 330–31 (5th Cir. 2006). 
152 Phipps, 319 F.3d at 180. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 180–81. 
155 Id. at 181. 
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motel, Phipps was about to rape the woman when Gilley, who 
was nervous, stopped him.156  Later, they drove with the woman 
to a nearby alley, but the woman was able to flee, fearing for her 
life.157  Neither Phipps nor Gilley chased her.158  They were 
arrested the next day.159  Both were found guilty by a jury of 
conspiracy to commit kidnapping, kidnapping, use of a firearm 
during and in relation to the kidnapping, carjacking, and using a 
firearm during and in relation to the carjacking,160 and both were 
sentenced to 65 years, 9 months and then to a term of supervised 
release.161 
A condition of the supervised release was that defendants 
could not possess “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating 
materials” and could not patronize “any place where such 
material or entertainment is available.”162  On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit admitted that the term was “somewhat vague” and noted 
that “a more definite condition might be desirable,” but upheld 
the condition anyway given the wide discretion afforded to a 
district court and the commonsense manner in which the 
condition can be read.163  The Fifth Circuit, by applying a 
“commonsense reading” to the condition, rejected defendants’ 
argument that the condition could apply to lingerie 
advertisements or the “Song of Solomon.”164  The court also noted 
that the condition was narrowed by another condition imposed on 
the defendants that prohibited them from visiting any place 
where sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material is 
available.165  The Fifth Circuit concluded that the condition 
prohibited the defendants from viewing sexually stimulating 
material that is of the type that is available at strip clubs, adult 








162 Id. at 192–93. 
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III. DEFINING PORNOGRAPHY 
A. Policy Arguments for a More Specific Definition 
In addition to the constitutional issue of vagueness, there are 
three reasons justifying the requirement that sentencing courts, 
when imposing a condition of supervised release prohibiting the 
possession of pornography, should provide a specific definition of 
“pornography.” 
First, a sufficiently specific definition furthers the goal of 
transitioning a convict from rigid and restrictive prison life back 
into society, where he of she can lead a more productive and well-
meaning life.  Judges do not impose conditions to arbitrarily 
punish the person.  Because conditions are not meant to punish 
people on supervised release, a more specific definition will 
further the goals of supervised release.  A more specific definition 
will also provide the probationer with an objective set of criteria 
that will allow that person to avoid any conduct that would send 
him or her back to prison.  Furthermore, if supervised release is 
meant to assist the probationer in becoming a productive 
member of society, undefined conditions cut against this purpose 
because that probationer will not know what conduct is 
prohibited and what is not. 
Second, a more specific definition would be more efficient by 
conserving judicial and administrative resources.  Arresting and 
revoking supervised release consumes a lot of time, effort, and 
money.167  In addition to the time and expense of arresting and 
 
167 In 2007, in the federal system, there were 116,221 people under post-
conviction supervision. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS 13 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2007/front/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf. This 
represents a twenty-four percent increase since 1998. Id. Also, there was an 18.6% 
increase over criminal cases filed in 2007 as compared to 1998, and an almost 
eighty-percent increase over pending cases. Id. In 2007, there were 2,460 sexual 
offense criminal cases commenced, an increase of over eighty-five percent from 2003. 
Id. at 228. Nationwide, as of 2006, there were over five million adult men and 
women on probation or parole, a thirty-four percent increase from 1995. See Glaze & 
Bonczar, supra note 1, at 1. Also, while child sex offenses comprised a relatively 
small share of the total criminal caseload, they are “among the fastest growing 
crimes” in the federal system, mainly due to child pornography prosecutions. MARK 
MOTIVANS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEX EXPLOITATION OFFENDERS, 2006, 
at 1 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf; see also 
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processing a probationer for a violation of supervised release, a 
probationer is entitled to two hearings, both which must occur 
within a reasonable time.  Moreover, the probationer is entitled 
to counsel.  The hearings must be on the record, and the judge 
must provide a written statement detailing why he or she 
revoked the probationer’s supervised release.  While this time 
and expense is necessary for those who willfully violate 
conditions of supervised release, it is patently unnecessary when 
the probationer on supervised release is trying to conform his or 
her conduct but fails because he or she cannot understand the 
condition or because a probation officer decides the probationer 
has violated the condition.  Such waste can be avoided if a 
sentencing judge, at the hearing imposing sentence, provides a 
sufficiently specific definition of what constitutes “pornography” 
so that the probationer has notice as to what material he or she 
may or may not possess. 
Finally, requiring a sentencing court to impose a more 
specific definition of pornography does not restrict judicial 
discretion.  The courts will still have the authority to impose the 
condition; they will merely be required to include a specific 
definition when imposing a prohibition on viewing or possessing 
pornography.  Also, although courts have wide discretion in 
imposing sentences, this discretion is not absolute.  The 
Sentencing Guidelines and appellate review curtail a sentencing 
court’s ability to sentence a defendant any way it wants.  So even 
if requiring a more specific definition of pornography would 
curtail a judge’s discretion, it would not do so any more  
than the Sentencing Guidelines, congressional legislation, or 
constitutional principles do.  Finally, courts will probably 
welcome a more specific definition rather than struggling to find 
a constitutionally permissible definition. 
B. Policy Arguments Against a More Specific Definition 
Even though there are compelling constitutional and 
practical reasons to require sentencing courts to provide a more 
specific definition of pornography in conditions of supervised 
release, arguments exist against such a requirement. 
 
Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 CRIME & JUST. 149, 172 (1997) 
(noting the cost to supervise and the declining funding). 
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First, critics argue that a more specific definition of 
pornography is not necessary because sufficient safeguards exist 
to protect a probationer’s due process rights.  For example, a 
probation officer will use common sense to determine whether or 
not the material in the probationer’s possession constitutes 
pornography.  Similarly, a district court judge will use reason 
and precedent to determine whether a violation of the condition 
occurred.  Moreover, if for some reason both the probation officer 
and judge err, the revocation of supervised release can be 
appealed.  Finally, while a probationer is not entitled to all the 
due process requirements of a criminal trial, he still has the right 
to be heard at two hearings, the ability to be represented by 
counsel, and the opportunity to call and question witnesses. 
This argument, however, is not persuasive.  It ignores 
Supreme Court precedent that arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement violates due process rights.  This tenet is 
meaningless when a condition is completely subjective and relies 
on the personal predilections of those charged with the 
condition’s enforcement.  The purpose behind the void-for-
vagueness doctrine is to encourage sufficient specificity in the 
statute or condition so that a law-abiding citizen can tailor their 
conduct to avoid violating the law.  This doctrine is extremely 
important since being convicted of a crime deprives a person of 
liberty.  To require a person to be found in violation of a 
condition, then sent to jail, and remain in jail while his or her 
appeal is being reviewed because that person reasonably did not 
understand what conduct was prohibited strikes at the very 
heart of the Constitution.  Moreover, it is less efficient to discern 
ex post facto whether material is pornographic than to ensure 
that a probationer knows the law and can follow it.   
Second, critics assert that requiring sentencing courts to use 
specific language when imposing a condition banning 
pornography undermines judicial discretion to craft an 
appropriate sentence tailored to the individual wrongdoer.  
Sentencing judges need latitude to craft individualized sentences 
that are tailored to the particular factual situation.  Forcing a 
judge to impose a specific definition curtails this ability. 
This argument is problematic for several reasons.  First, 
judges usually impose conditions prohibiting possession of 
pornography when the probationer has been convicted of a sex 
offense, but they do not distinguish between sex offenses.  Thus, 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 727 (2010) 
2010] BARELY LEGAL 751 
a person convicted of rape of an adult woman and a person 
convicted of possessing child pornography will probably get the 
same prohibition—no possession of pornography, even legal adult 
pornography—even though the crimes are very different.168  Also, 
if a judge wants to limit the scope of the prohibition beyond the 
definition provided, he or she is free to do so. 
Second, as noted above, judges do not have unlimited 
discretion to impose whatever sentence they like.  Not only are 
judges constrained by constitutional concerns, they must 
sentence according to statute and are required to consult the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Moreover, a judge who fails to 
adequately explain any departure from the Guidelines risks 
reversal on appeal.  Finally, requiring judges to define what they 
mean when imposing otherwise vague conditions does not impact 
their discretion; it merely requires them to be more precise in the 
language they use.  Judges are still free to impose a condition 
prohibiting possession of pornography. 
Finally, critics argue that if the definition is too specific, then 
the probationer will be able to tailor his or her activity right up to 
the line and will act with a wrongful state of mind but not be 
punished.  If the condition is too specific, then the probationer 
 
168 There is a sociological argument that it may not be wise to prohibit access to 
legal pornography. Under the “catharsis theory,” pornography acts as a safety valve 
because the repeated exposure of pornographic images will decrease the desire and 
interest of the viewer. See LIZ KELLY, RACHEL WINGFIELD, SHEILA BURTON & LINDA 
REGAN, SPLINTERED LIVES: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN THE CONTEXT OF 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND CHILD PROTECTION 23 (1995), available at 
http://www.barnardos.org.uk/splintered_lives_report.pdf; see also Ronald J. Berger, 
Patricia Searles & Charles E. Cottle, Ideological Contours of the Contemporary 
Pornography Debate, 11 FRONTIERS 30, 34 (1990) (noting that in popular opinion a 
majority of both men and women that pornography provides “an outlet for bottled-up 
impulses”); W. Cody Wilson, Facts Versus Fears: Why Should We Worry About 
Pornography?, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Sept. 1971, at 105, 115. But see 
Diana E.H. Russell & Natalie J. Purcell, Exposure to Pornography as a Cause of 
Child Sexual Victimization, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, & VIOLENCE 59, 
60–61 (Nancy E. Dowd, Dorothy G. Singer & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2006) 
(criticizing catharsis theory); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First 
Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 599 n.71 (noting that catharsis theory has little 
empirical support). Therefore, it would seem, prohibiting a sex offender from viewing 
legal adult pornography may have the opposite intended effect of increasing the 
offender’s desire to the point that he commits a crime. Of course, there is an equally 
plausible argument that viewing pornography fuels the sex offender’s fantasies and 
actually increases the offender’s desire to commit a sex offense. See Dana A. 
Fraytak, The Influence of Pornography on Rape and Violence Against Women: A 
Social Science Approach, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 291–92 (2001). 
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will know exactly how far to the line he or she can go.  Thus, 
while the probationer is engaging in conduct that goes against 
the purposes of imposing the condition, the court will have no 
choice but to release the probationer and find that there was no 
violation. 
This argument is also faulty.  A more specific definition is 
designed to give a probationer notice and prevent arbitrary 
enforcement.  It will encompass the type of material that a judge 
would have reasonably determined to be pornographic.  If 
anything, a probationer will be sure to tailor his or her behavior 
to not violate the condition, thus satisfying the rehabilitative and 
public safety purposes of imposing conditions of supervised 
release.  In any case, this argument applies equally to criminal 
statutes, but courts have not struggled with requiring sufficient 
specificity in those statutes.  For example, the Chicago law 
struck down in City of Chicago v. Morales prohibited “criminal 
street gang members” from remaining in any one place with no 
apparent purpose.169  As the Court noted, a person with a guilty 
mindset could avoid violating the law by making apparent his 
purpose in remaining in one place, while a person with an 
innocent mindset could be found guilty under the law by simply 
being with a family member who happened to be a gang 
member.170 
C. A Modest Proposal 
The Sentencing Guidelines need a straightforward, clear 
definition of “pornography” that will not only give a probationer 
clear notice as to what material is prohibited and prevent 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, but will also ensure 
that the goals of supervised release, rehabilitation, and public 
safety remain intact. 
Over the years, judges, legislators, and scholars have 
struggled to define “pornography.”  They have been hampered, 
however, because the need to define “pornography” existed in the 
context of regulating it.  Those who attempted to define 
“pornography” did so to restrict its dissemination without 
violating a person’s First Amendment right to create and possess 
non-obscene material.  Fortunately, in the context of conditions of 
 
169 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 47 (1999) (plurality opinion). 
170 See id. at 62–63; see also supra note 57. 
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supervised release, no such problem exists because people on 
supervised release can have their constitutional rights 
curtailed.171 
While the term “obscenity” has been defined by the Supreme 
Court,172 “pornography” carries no such legal definition.  Courts 
have looked to the dictionary definition, which they quickly 
dismiss as too broad173 and have also stuck down certain 
legislative attempts to define “pornography.”174  Scholars have 
also attempted to define “pornography,” with little acceptance.175 
In the criminal context, Congress has defined “pornography” 
as it relates to child pornography.176  Thus, when advising district 
courts on how to impose a sufficiently specific definition of 
“pornography,” the circuit courts have used that definition of 
“pornography” to illustrate a definition that is sufficiently 
specific.  That statute defines “pornography” as “any visual 
depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or 
computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made 
or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of 
sexually explicit conduct.”177  “Sexually explicit conduct” is 
defined as “actual or simulated (i) sexual intercourse, including 
genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether 
 
171 See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.  
172 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–26 (1973); see also Pope v. Illinois, 
481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987); Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 297 (1978); 
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301, 305 (1977). 
173 See, e.g., United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263–64 (3d Cir. 2001). 
174 See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 334 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(striking statute down on First Amendment grounds), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
175 See James Lindgren, Defining Pornography, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1153, 1155–
59 (1993). Lindgren empirically studies the application of three different definitions 
of pornography. See id. at 1156. The first definition is simply the Miller obscenity 
test. See id. at 1159. The second definition was the definition drafted by Andrea 
Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, which was struck down by the Seventh Circuit 
on First Amendment grounds. See id. at 1156–57. Lindgren notes that this definition 
“has three elements: graphic sexual explicitness, the subordination of women, and 
depictions of any one of a long list of specific sexual acts.” Id. at 1157. Finally, 
Lindgren tests a definition proposed by Cass Sunstein: “In short, regulable 
pornography must (a)  be sexually explicit, (b) depict women as enjoying or deserving 
some form of physical abuse, and (c) have the purpose and effect of producing sexual 
arousal.” Id. at 1158 n.16 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First 
Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 592). Lindgren notes that all three of these 
definitions were criticized for being overbroad, underbroad, and vague. See id. at 
1157–59. 
176 See 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2006). 
177 Id. § 2256(8). 
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between persons of the same or opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; 
(iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or 
(v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any 
person.”178 
While this definition provides a specific definition of 
“pornography” and would survive any vagueness challenge, this 
definition is both under inclusive and over inclusive of the 
material it would prohibit.  Thus, certain material that the court 
would not intend to prohibit would be prohibited, and other 
material that the court did intend to prohibit would not be 
prohibited.  For example, a probationer would be prohibited from 
viewing an art house or foreign film that contains significant 
artistic merit and is considered to be a cinematic masterpiece 
because it might contain simulated sexual intercourse.179  On the 
other hand, this definition would not prohibit possession of 
Playboy or other nude depictions of the human body, unless the 
probation officer determined that the depiction was a “lascivious 
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.”180  Therefore, while this 
is a good starting definition, some minor modifications are 
necessary to ensure the material the court intends to prohibited 
are in fact prohibited and no more. 
The following definition of pornography should accomplish 
these goals: Pornography shall be defined as  
 
178 Id. § 2256(2)(A). The statute also has a specific definition related to child 
pornography that involves computer generated images. See id. § 2256(8)(B), (2)(B). 
Essentially, it adds “graphic” and “lascivious” to the definition of sexually explicit 
conduct. See id. § 2256(2)(B). 
179 Movies that come to mind are the Oscar-nominated LAST TANGO IN PARIS 
(United Artists 1973) with Marlon Brando, see Jack Mathews, Wanted: New MPAA 
Boss—It May Be Time for Jack Valenti To Step Aside, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 1, 
1999, at 19; HENRY & JUNE (Universal Pictures 1990), the first movie to receive the 
MPAA’s NC-17 rating, see Peter Rainer, Wispy ‘Henry & June’ All Soul, No Body, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1990, at F1 (“[I]ts eroticism is far more suggestive than 
explicit.”); and the Mexican film of forbidden love, LIKE WATER FOR CHOCOLATE 
(Miramax Films 1992), which became the highest grossing foreign film released in 
the United States at the time of its release, see Beth Kleid, Morning Report, L.A. 
TIMES, May 2, 1994, at F2. All of these films contain scenes of simulated sexual 
intercourse. 
180 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A). It should be noted that the book that the Second 
Circuit found to be pornographic could arguably fit under this definition because it 
contained pictures of nude men, which the Second Circuit noted showed men with 
erect penises and “some of the men appear[ed] to be touching themselves.” See 
Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 477 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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(a)(1) any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, 
video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or 
picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or 
other means, of sexually explicit conduct; or (2) any textual 
material describing sexually explicit conduct accompanied by 
visual depictions of the naked human body, such 
accompaniment to be taken from the publication as a whole; 
and  
(b) that a reasonable person could believe is intended to arouse 
sexual excitement. 
(c) “Sexually explicit conduct” is defined as actual or simulated 
(1) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, 
anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same 
or opposite sex; (2) bestiality; (3) masturbation; (4) sadistic or 
masochistic abuse; or (5) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or 
pubic area of any person. 
The proposed definition, while incorporating many aspects of 
the definition from 18 U.S.C. § 2256, both expands and limits 
that definition so that courts can be sure that what they intend 
to prohibit is actually prohibited.  The definition is expanded by 
including textual material in a publication accompanied by 
pictures of nude people in the definition.  Thus, a probationer 
would now know for sure that he or she cannot possess a book 
that has graphic descriptions of sexually explicit conduct but only 
has pictures of nude people.  The probationer will also be on 
notice that a book of literary erotica will be acceptable because it 
will usually not contain any pictures at all.  The definition is 
limited by adding an intent requirement.  To be clear, the 
subjective intent of the creator is not the issue.  A court must 
merely determine whether a reasonable person, upon viewing the 
material, would reasonably think that the creator intended to 
arouse sexual excitement in the viewer.  Thus, art house and 
foreign films, as well as art work such as paintings and statues, 
considered to be of high artistic quality will not fall within this 
definition because a reasonable person viewing the material as a 
whole could conclude that the material was not designed to 
arouse sexual excitement, which is required in subsection (b). 
Thus a probationer will have notice “that will enable [him or 
her] to understand what conduct [the condition] prohibits.”181  
This definition will also prevent arbitrary and discriminatory 
 
181 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (plurality opinion). 
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enforcement since it provides the probation officer with a 
standard to enforce the condition.  For example, photographs or 
videos of hard-core pornography are explicitly prohibited.  Also, 
Playboy, Penthouse, and other similar magazines featuring nude 
people will be prohibited.  However, books such as Lolita and 
medical textbooks would not be prohibited, although a book like 
the Kama Sutra would be because it has visual depictions of 
sexually explicit conduct.  Also, magazines like GQ, Maxim, and 
Vogue would not be prohibited because they generally contain no 
nudity, but even if they do, it is not “lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area of any person,” and a reasonable person 
could conclude that the creator did not intend to arouse sexual 
excitement.  Because there is now a definition of pornography, a 
probationer will no longer be able to challenge the condition on 
vagueness grounds. 
Moreover, providing this language in the Sentencing 
Guidelines will not limit discretion.  Judges still have the ability 
to impose the condition.  This definition merely assists them in 
providing them with language that can be used to accomplish 
what the courts intend when they impose the condition.  
Furthermore, because of this definition, probation officers and 
judges will not be burdened trying to determine whether the 
probationer possesses material that is pornographic.  This will 
lead to more efficiency and reduce the strain on an otherwise 
overburdened system.  Also, probation officers can spend more 
time rehabilitating the probationer as opposed to punishing 
someone who reasonably believed his conduct did not violate any 
condition. 
This definition could be implemented in either of two ways.  
First, the Sentencing Commission could include the definition in 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual by adding subsection (D) 
to section 5B1.3(d)(7).  This method is preferable because 
probationers are presumed to know the statutes, and therefore, if 
the court failed to define “pornography” when imposing the 
condition, the probationer could not challenge it on vagueness 
grounds since it is defined in the Sentencing Guidelines.182  
Alternatively, the courts themselves could include the definition 
in a condition prohibiting possession of pornography because 
 
182 It should be noted, though, that sentencing courts should still specifically 
state the language of the statute when imposing a sentence to ensure that any doubt 
is removed from the probationer’s mind. 
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18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(22) allows the courts to impose conditions 
they think appropriate in the circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
The right to have fair warning about prohibited conduct is an 
inviolate right under due process, and this right applies both to 
those who have not committed crimes and to those who have 
been convicted of crimes.  The essence of due process prohibits 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  Just like everyone 
else, a probationer must know with sufficient specificity what 
conduct is prohibited.  For these reasons, when applying a 
condition prohibiting pornography, courts must define that term 
with sufficient specificity.  The specific definition proposed will 
do that while balancing the needs of judicial discretion to impose 
sentences, the rights of the probationer, and the goals of the 
Guidelines to protect the public and promote rehabilitation. 
 
